



# What is a visual object?

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**The concept of an ‘object’ plays a central role in cognitive science, particularly in vision, reasoning and conceptual development – but it has rarely been given a concrete formal definition. Here I argue that visual objects cannot be defined according to simple physical properties but can instead be understood in terms of the hierarchical organization of visual scene interpretations. Within the tree describing such a hierarchical description, certain nodes make natural candidates as the ‘joints’ between objects, representing division points between parts of the image that cohere internally but do not perceptually group with one another. Thus each subtree hanging from such a node corresponds to a single perceived ‘object’. This formal definition accords with several intuitions about the way objects behave.**

Objects are everywhere in cognitive science. Objects are thought to be the building blocks of children’s conception of the physical world [1,2]; to delineate the boundaries respected by visual attention [3–5]; and to influence neural processing even at the earliest stages of visual cortex [6,7].

But what exactly *is* an object? In a phrase due to the American jurist Potter Stewart, ‘we know one when we see one’ – but what does the word actually mean? How do we know where one object ends and the next begins?

The premise of this article is that this is not (as it were) an ‘objective’ question, but rather one that relates to how we mentally divide the world up into coherent units. That is, it is less about physics and more about the mental assumptions lurking behind the word ‘coherent’. The division of the world into objects seems so intuitive and effortless, at least under everyday conditions, that we speak about this division as if the world provided it overtly, without any contribution from our brains. But if cognitive science has shown anything, it has shown that what seems subjectively obvious is often the result of complex and subtle computations. The division of the world into objects is a case in point. The fallacy (philosophers would call it ‘Naive Realism’) is epitomized by Woody Allen’s tale of the Great Roe, a mythical beast with ‘the head of a lion, and the body of a lion, although not the same lion’ [8]. If (and only if) it looks like an object, and quacks like an object, it’s an object. Perception dictates.

In the same way that a fist is something that a set of five fingers turns into only when they are organized a particular way, objects are subsets of the world to which has been attached – by the perceiver – a particular kind of

subjective organization. And like a fist, objects take on special significance and definite properties only by virtue of this organization. Therefore, in seeking a definition of objects, I would argue, we need to focus not on how the *world* is structured, but rather on how our subjective perceptual *interpretations* are organized, and then ask how this kind of organization most naturally decomposes into object-like components.

But what kind of organization turns inchoate visual ‘stuff’ into a coherent object? Unfortunately, no simple answer to this question is to be found in the literature on perceptual grouping.

First, no *single* grouping cue defines objects. ‘Real’ objects and object boundaries tend to obey a variety of nice properties – including closure [9,10], connectedness [11], convexity [12,13], good continuation in their contours [14–18], regularity of shape [19,20], and so forth. But although each of these properties contributes to the perception of objects, none is, in and of itself, essential. Counterexamples can be found for each principle – perfectly good objects that are concave, have irregular shapes or boundaries, and so on. Similarly, one can easily find non-objects obeying any one of the principles – for example, crossed sticks (which are uniformly connected and yet perceived as multiple objects).

Hence some more abstract organizational principle is required, perhaps drawing together several otherwise disparate individual rules. The Gestalt term *Prägnanz* – ‘goodness of form’ – is one famous attempt at such a principle, as are other terms arising from the developmental literature, such as ‘boundedness’ and ‘cohesiveness’ (e.g. see [1]). These terms are intuitively helpful but, I think, too vague or ill-defined to get us beyond Stewart’s ‘we know one when we see one’.

Second, although visual psychologists often loosely use the term ‘objects’ to refer to the fruits of grouping processes, most grouping processes studied in the literature relate to the formation of contours, textures and surfaces – image units that cohere but are not, by themselves, complete objects. Objects are in a sense the ultimate product of such processes, carried out until there is no more grouping left to be done. As Anne Treisman put it [21], objects are ‘complex wholes’. But what does it mean for a visual group to be ‘whole’?

## Hierarchical organization in vision

Many researchers have noted that perceptual organization tends to be hierarchical, with spatial relations defined at different spatial scales. Such proposals have come out of psychology [10,22–24], as well as computer vision [25]. Formally, a hierarchical description corresponds

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


Fig. 1. A simple tree (see text).

to a 'tree', in which the root node (normally drawn at the top) describes the configuration at the most global level, while its subtrees describe finer or more local spatial relations, and their subtrees even finer ones, all the way down to the leaves, which correspond to individual visual elements (pixels, dots, oriented edges, etc.). Recently, this type of organization has become popular in computer vision (e.g. see [26,27]). In these proposals, visual groups correspond to particular components (subtrees) of the tree, namely those that are in a formal sense maximally disjoint from each other. Grouping then becomes a process of finding the cleanest 'joints' in the tree, points technically referred to as 'normalized cuts'. The proposal below is in very much the same spirit, although expressed in somewhat more general terms.

In general then, at each node in such a tree is some sort of representation of the spatial relations in force among the tree's subtrees. For example, the tree in Fig. 1 describes a collinear arrangement of two visual elements *edge1* and *edge2*. The representation at each node is expressed in your visual representation language of choice, probably using the regularities and principles mentioned above (closure, collinearity, connectedness, convexity, etc.) – depending on your chosen theory of visual representation. As we are focusing here on the more abstract principle drawing these individual rules together, for current purposes the choice doesn't much matter. (For the purpose of producing a useful description of the scene, the choice matters a lot of course.) The idea is simply that visual items that are the common arguments of a visual predicate – that is, both children of the same node in the tree – tend to be grouped [28].

We also need some way of representing the 'degree of regularity' of the spatial arrangement between the subtrees, with a special way of designating zero regularity. Zero regularity means 'no special relationship' – what mathematicians call 'general position' or a 'generic' relationship. Three points are said to be in general position if they do not fall in a line (that would be a 'special' configuration), four points are in general position if they do not fall in a plane, and so forth. 'Special configurations' (what generic configurations are *not*) are defined by the chosen language of spatial representations, and include visual relationships that the system chooses to elevate to the status of 'atomic' descriptors – such as the grouping predicates listed above – as well as any possible combination of these atoms. So regular (non-generic, special) means 'exhibiting some structure recognized by the system, such as collinear, parallel, touching... [or whatever]', and generic means 'none of the above'.

In other articles [29,30] I have proposed ways of measuring the degree of regularity numerically, with generic corresponding to zero. (The simplest way is simply to count the descriptors that apply, which gives the 'logical depth' of the configuration.) The details are not important here: the point is that visual elements bearing some special, perhaps non-accidental, relation to each other tend to be grouped.

How does the system actually compute the best hierarchical description of an image? That is a separate and much larger question, which is taken up at length elsewhere [29,30]; see also [26,27]). Here, I focus instead on the question of how, given a tree, one can most reasonably divide it into coherent and self-contained units – or objects.

### Disjoints

Within the entire tree that hierarchically represents a visual scene, a special role is played by nodes that are generic (zero structure), denoted with the symbol  $\emptyset$  (see Box 1 and Fig. 2). At such nodes, the subtrees have literally

#### Box 1. Key terms

A **tree** is a diagram with a hierarchically branching structure, usually drawn with the 'root' at the top (see Fig. 1). The nodes adjoining a node below are its **children**. The node at the top of the tree is called the **head**, and those at the very bottom are called the **leaves**.

A **subtree** is a tree contained within a tree, including all the nodes and edges that branch downwards from any given node (the head of the subtree).

Trees are useful for depicting the **spatial relations** among elements and groups of elements of a visual image. The leaves of the tree correspond to individual visual elements, such as dots or edges, and subtrees correspond to perceptual groups at various levels of the hierarchy.

Spatial relations depicted at each node can include **non-accidental properties** (i.e. spatial relations that are unlikely to be an "accident", such as collinearity, parallelism, etc). When there is no such special spatial relationship, the relation is called **generic** ('nothing special'); otherwise, it is **non-generic** or **regular**. Generic nodes are indicated by a  $\emptyset$  in the tree diagram.

A **disjoint** is a generic node with at least one regular child.

A **disjoint regular subtree**, or an '**object**', is a subtree that (a) hangs from a disjoint and (b) has a regular head.





Fig. 1. Illustration of terms (see text).



**Fig. 2.** Three consequences of the object definition. (a) When an object breaks, with an accidental spatial relation replacing a non-accidental one, the corresponding interpretation tree forms a disjoint and splits into two objects. (b) When two objects are juxtaposed non-accidentally, a disjoint disappears and two objects coalesce into one. (c) When an image (center) can be interpreted two different ways (left and right), phenomenal objects can change. Here, the grid of dots can be seen as horizontally or vertically striped.

no recognizable mutual spatial relation, and hence are not grouped together at all. Sometimes, these subtrees can themselves be structureless – for example only having generically related visual items in their scope (e.g. random dots). But when they are not – when their top node is *non-generic* – then they constitute complete formal substructures of the visual hierarchy. Such subtrees are both ‘disjoint’ (i.e. they hang from a disjoint node, and thus are not grouped with the rest of the image) and ‘regular’ (i.e. their head node is non-generic) – so I will refer to them as ‘disjoint regular subtrees’, and call the generic nodes from which they hang ‘disjoints’ (see [Box 1](#)). The disjoint regular subtrees, separated by disjoints, are the largest internally coherent components that do not group with the rest of the

tree. Hence in a very natural sense, the disjoint regular subtrees are the objects [31].

Note that it is a consequence of the formal structure of trees that each subtree is connected to the rest of the tree at only one place – its top node. (By definition, trees have diagrams that only branch, never rejoin, as you move down.) Hence ‘breaking’ this node is enough to completely disconnect the subtree from the rest of the tree. The disjoint regular subtrees – objects – fall off the tree like ripe plums clipped at their stems.

#### Tweaking the definition

We can easily weaken the above object definition to allow for less-than-perfect disjunction of objects from the rest of



## Conclusion

Objects cannot be adequately defined by any simple physical property, nor even any simple *perceptual* property; they require a more abstract definition. Intuitively, objects are components of the subjective visual interpretation that are both coherent and complete. Hence defining them formally means asking how subjective interpretations are formally structured, and then considering how this kind of formal structure most naturally decomposes, or 'breaks apart at the seams'. A very natural way of expressing perceptual interpretations is in terms of hierarchical descriptions, or trees. Then the only question is how to divide the whole tree most naturally into subtrees, and I have argued that the most natural choice is into disjoint regular subtrees. Each such subtree is a component of the tree that contains internal structure, but is formally disjoint from the rest of the tree. This very naturally captures the intuition of a visual unit that coheres, but is not grouped with other units in the image – an object.

## Future directions

The question of objects is, to be sure, broader than that discussed here. Objects are important not only because of their role in perceived spatial organization, which I have focused on, but also because of their role in our conceptual organization of the world. Consider these three different roles played by objects, each of which has been studied in the literature:

- (1) Objects are the units of our perceived physical world – spatially coherent bundles of visual stuff (the sense of 'object' explored in this article);
- (2) Objects are the units of our ontology – the things we think of as having independent existence, properties, and attributes;
- (3) Objects are the units of mental dynamics – the things we think of as having fixed existence in a world that changes over time.

These three senses of 'object' are substantially logically independent from each other. For example it is not logically necessary to assume that only spatially coherent units tend to be stable over time, or that properties should be associated only with spatially coherent units. Spatial coherence, material properties, and dynamics are all independent – in principle, but *not* in our conception of things. Hence in my view the question that ought to drive future research on objects is: what do (1), (2), and (3) have to do with each other?

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