Katzaroff has outlined a conception of recognition very close to the one I arrived at in the wake of some experiments with a hypnotic subject and a case of Korsakow syndrome. I should like to say a few words of this "theory of me-ness," which is similar to James's conception, and a more or less clear formulation of which we both arrived at independently. Let us first recall—as does Katzaroff—that the psychological problem of recognition does not imply a consciousness of the past. For the logician, for the common man, and for the psychologist who regards mental activity from an objective point of view, recognition doubtless means that the object one recognizes is already known to him. But is that consciousness of repetition—or more exactly, of the déjà ("already before")—really contained in what is immediately given subjectively in recognition, that is, in the feeling of familiarity? It does not seem so: when

2. Katzaroff (378).
3. James (353, I, 650) wrote:

   . . . So that if we wish to think of a particular past epoch, we must think of a name or other symbol, or else of certain concrete events, associated therewithal. Both must be thought of, to think the past epoch adequately. And to "refer" any special fact to the past epoch is to think that fact with the names and events which characterize its date, to think it, in short, with a lot of contiguous associates.

   But even this would not be memory. Memory requires more than mere dating of a fact in the past. It must be dated in my past. In other words, I must think that I directly experienced its occurrence. It must have that "warmth and intimacy" which were so often spoken of in the chapter on the Self, as characterizing all experiences "appropriated" by the thinker as his own.

   James here refers to Chap. V in his Vol. I, which is still rewarding reading. His keen analysis of self-experience and of the role of the self in psychological processes in general, and thought-processes in particular, poses many questions still unanswered. His section on multiple personalities (pp. 379 ff.) makes particularly fortunate use of clinical material to explore the role of the self in memory and thought-processes.

4. Unlike Claparède, James (353) maintained that memory implies "dating of a fact in the past"; but like Claparède, he realized that it involves another component: "the object of memory is only an object imagined in the past to which
we are shown a design which has been presented to us before, the impression of familiarity, known-ness, like-ness, emerges before the impression of déjà, and may even stand alone. Introspection shows this. It is true that in the usual circumstances of life we are prone to localize in the past the impressions we recognize, and this localization can be so rapid that it seems to be an integral part of the immediate recognition process. But this is just an illusion. If we consider the genesis of the mind, we find that recognition appeared much earlier than any localization. Animals show implicit recognition (of certain prey, of their domicile, and so on), though nothing in their behavior indicates that they apprehend the past and keep count of the dates of events. In children, recognition appears long before any notion of the past.

The emotion of belief adheres” (353, I, 652).

5. This use of introspective evidence is questionable (a) unlike Lewin (460, 783), Claparède adduces introspective data as direct evidence, and not to complement and interpret behavioral data; (b) the subject-matter of these introspections is subtly elusive, being the distinction between experiences of “past-ness” and “familiarity” which are not well-defined, and the finer shadings of which particularly are little known. This reservation does not question the common impression that—within limits—the less well-known an object, the more a feeling of familiarity precedes the experience of “déjà” and localization in the past. It merely questions how reliable this “impression” is, and what exactly it means. For example, in encountering objects which are extremely well-known our experience is neither one of recognition, nor of familiarity, nor of past-ness.

The experiments Claparède reports below may be so adapted as to provide behavior-data to complement and interpret introspections.

6.* The theory which accounts for recognition by a localization in the past has hardly any advocates now. It is evident that localization in the past cannot explain—because it implies—recognition: to know whether one has localized correctly, to find the right one in a series of past events and the place where the memory-image is to be inserted, one must first recognize both the series and its diverse elements. Further, to affirm that an event has already been experienced, one must refer to a series of past events; but the utilization of that series presupposes what we have come to call recognition.

7. This argument may seem questionable, particularly since we have no evidence that recognition in animal and child is the same process as recognition in the adult human. For example, Lorenz (484) reports that unless the mother stork approaches the nest in a certain rigidly defined manner, the baby storks do not take food from her; neither does the mother stork feed its young unless they open and shut their beaks in a similarly well-defined manner. If a process of recognition is implied here, it would seem to be different from that in grown-up humans, being far more rigidly tied
Furthermore, we have cases where a feeling of familiarity accompanies the perceptions which the person is certain he has never had before: thus for instance it is characteristic of paramnesia that in it a feeling of familiarity is accompanied by that of *non-déjà vu* ⁸* (“not having seen before”). The same to certain “signs” and “valences.” It is possible, however, that we take an exaggerated view of this difference. Should not the Zeigarnik (783) experiments warn us that memory (and recognition?) are more dependent on valences than learning experiments would have us believe? Cf. also Rapaport (591).

 Elsewhere in my comments (Chap. 15, note 31, below) I have cited evidence for two kinds of organization of memory: the drive (motivational), and the conceptual. The distinction was not meant as a dichotomy, and the transition between the two was conceived to be fluid. Localization in the past and the experience of “déjà” are frames of reference within the conceptual organization of memory. Claparède’s, Katzaroff’s, and James’s views concerning the role of “me-ness” in recognition may be considered early realizations of the existence of an organization of memories other than associative-conceptual. In fact, the “me-ness” of memories could be viewed as an indication that the “motivational organization” participates even in memory phenomena which are regulated by the associative-conceptual memory organization.

The relation between recognition in children and animals, and their notion of a past, bears only distantly on this central issue.

⁸* I know full well that in paramnesias this impression is described as one of *déjà vu*. But I believe the *déjà* to be a secondary interpretation of the impression of familiarity. As far as I can judge by my own experience, the immediate impression of paramnesia is that of familiarity; it is exactly because this impression evokes nothing from the past that it seems bizarre and paradoxical, and that the subjects have the definite feeling of having seen it “in another life.”

[ Cf. Plato’s “anamnesis” theory (570, pp. 365–66). The “not learned” (non empirical) knowledge which man discovers by deduction (ratio) is attributed by Plato to learning which has taken place “in another life.” Whether subjective experiences of the sort here described could underlie such philosophical speculation is an intriguing, and for the psychology of invention, relevant problem. Cf. Freud (230, p. 366).]

⁹. Concerning *déjà vu*, cf. Chap. 25, p. 573 and note 274, below. The only psychological explanation so far of *déjà vu* (“fausse reconnaissance”) is Freud’s (210, pp. 168–71, 230). An example will illustrate his explanation (230, p. 337):

The patient, who was at that time a twelve-year-old child, was visiting a family in which there was a brother who was seriously ill and at the point of death; while her own brother had been in a similarly dangerous condition a few months earlier. But with the earlier of these two similar events there had been associated a fantasy that was incapable of entering consciousness—namely, a wish that her brother should die. Consequently, the analogy between the two cases could not become conscious. And the perception of it was replaced by the phenomenon of “having been through it all be-
holds for phenomena of *premonition* or *prévision immédiate*. For example, a lady hears for the first time a lecturer on a topic unknown to her; it seems to her that the moment he speaks she knows what he will say.\(^{10}\) This is a feeling of familiarity which has nothing to do with the past because it applies to the future.\(^{11}\)

There are other feelings of this sort, more or less similar to that of familiarity, and like it they refer to past events yet do not themselves imply the notion of past: such, for instance, is the *feeling of the usual*. We have this because we repeatedly encounter identical circumstances, and our body, our reflexes, our very senses are so accustomed to these that our consciousness does not perceive them. This feeling of the usual is more subjective, more corporeal, than that of familiarity.

According to our theory, an object is recognized because it evokes a feeling

fore,” the identity being displaced from the really common element on to the locality. Cf. also Poetzl (574). More recently Bergler (47, p. 166) summarizing the psychoanalytic literature of *déjà vu* wrote:

*Déjà vu* is a response to an Id wish which, provoked by a real situation, emerges and causes the unconscious Ego to defend itself against it. In place of the repetition of an unconscious fantasy appears the sensation of *déjà vu*. The identity of two repressed fantasied experiences is replaced in consciousness by the identity of two apparently real situations. The Id impulse is primary; in Freud’s example it is an aggressive Id wish, in Ferenczi’s a libidinous one. Reality plays only the role of agent provocateur; the Id makes use of a favorable opportunity offered by the outer world to attempt to reel off an instinctual impulse.

Bergler adds his own observations in which the repressed is not an id-wish but a superego reproach. It may be surmised that other repressed and suppressed impulses (such as affects, ego interest, etc.) will also prove capable of producing *déjà vu* phenomena.

These psychoanalytic inferences shed light on the nature of “me-ness,” which Claparède holds responsible when events are experienced, whether correctly or not, as though encountered before. The phenomenon is similar to slips of the tongue. But while in the latter the repressed impulse encroaches on the content of the reality-adequate thought, in the former it affects the manner of perceiving reality. That which is familiar to the subject is his previous self-experience of defense against the repressed impulse. It is indeed a “me-ness” experience, but a very specific one: the “me-ness” of a defensive position of the ego.\(^{10}\) Fairbanks (169).

11. These phenomena—like the *déjà entendu, déjà raconté, déjà éprouvé*, and *déjà senti* described by Freud—are varieties of *déjà vu*. See also Chap. 13, notes 25, and 29, below.

Claparède’s argument that these apply to the future fastens on their manner of appearance. Like *déjà vu* phenomena, these too probably have their roots in repressed past experiences.
of “me-ness” to which it is tied by virtue of its previous presentations to the subject’s consciousness.\textsuperscript{12}

Does this approach differ from those which make recognition a consciousness of habit, or of associations which surround all repeated impressions? Could it not be maintained that the difference is but verbal, and that basically this “me-ness,” characteristic of perceptions previously “experienced,” rests only on the associations of these perceptions with other ideas (the woof of which is the \textit{me}), and is but a name for the feeling which sets the associative chain in motion? No, because innumerable associative chains are stimulated or substimulated in one’s life without giving a feeling of familiarity.\textsuperscript{13} We can have entirely different feelings when a group of associations is suddenly evoked, such as, “That’s it” or “That fits.” It happens to me sometimes that I walk up to a shelf in my library to get a certain volume, but as I reach out I do not know which I am looking for. Then I begin to regard the books on the shelf to which my legs have automatically carried me, and when my eyes fall upon the title of the book I need, I have the impression “That’s the one,” an impression certainly akin to that of familiarity yet different from it. There is no doubt that the impression of “That’s it” has a physiological substratum in that a perception stimulates a group of associations or momentarily suspended reactions. It is said that recognition consists in the unlatching of a suitable attitude: to recognize an object is to relate adequately to it. This is true to a great extent. Yet, if that adequate attitude is not accompanied by a feeling that the attitude or its object is familiar, we cannot properly speak of recognition but of \textit{comprehension}. . . . However close this phenomenon is to recognition, it is clearly not the same.\textsuperscript{14}

We shall soon see, in connection with a case of Korsakow syndrome, that a

\textsuperscript{12} In terms of the psychoanalytic theory, we would express this as, “by virtue of the identical striving it aroused”; and in Lewin’s, “by virtue of the identical need it had a valence for.”

\textsuperscript{13} This speculative argument is indirectly reinforced by recent experimental evidence, most of which regrettably pertains to recall and perception phenomena. The only study which deals directly with recognition, that of Tresselt and Levy (734), is no more than suggestive, because of an unfortunate choice of the material to be recognized. The study concludes that ego-involvement (presumably related to “me-ness”) enhances recognition. Concerning ego-involvement, see Sherif and Cantril (686). For a critique of associative-learning theory from the point of view of ego-involvement, see Alper (28).

\textsuperscript{14} If we assume that for something to be “familiar” implies an experience of “me-ness,” then we must conclude that Claparède’s “attitude” concept was quite different from the current one.
chain of fitting associations does not suffice to produce recognition. Yet those associations which do play a role are not just any kind, but those between the perception and the feeling of me-ness.\textsuperscript{15}

But what is this feeling of “me-ness”? What are its physiological bases? It matters little. I take it to be a fact of observation. If I have experienced a thing, I have the feeling that it is mine, belongs to my experience. This feeling manifests itself even after a few moments of observing a new object: as the object is considered and (ap)perceived, it becomes progressively familiar, appears more and more intimate, and attains finally the character of being “my object.” It is not surprising then if on reappearing,\textsuperscript{16}\textsuperscript{*} after some time has elapsed, it again evokes that feeling.\textsuperscript{17}

An attitude now by definition implies “me-ness.” Compare our discussion of attitudes, in Chap. 1, notes 3 and 31. Actually, both in Bartlett’s (37) and Koffka’s (406) theory, it is the attitudes operating in recognition that confer “me-ness” on it. This also is the core of the psychoanalytic theory of déjà vu: the rousing of a definite (repressed) striving confers upon the experience the character of “me-ness” and “already seen.” It might be concluded that an abstract “me-ness” does not exist, and that only concrete conditions of the ego (attitudes, etc.) arouse specific and qualitatively varied experiences of “me-ness.”

15. Bartlett (37), summarizing his experiments on perceiving and recognizing, comes to a similar conclusion. His distinction between hearing and listening parallels Claparède’s between “just any” association and that with “the feeling of ‘me-ness.’” Bartlett wrote:

Under no circumstances whatever does hearing without listening provide a sufficient basis for recognition. Listening, like hearing, is selective, but here the characteristics of the stimulus play a secondary part. Selective listening is determined mainly by the qualitative differences of stimuli in relation to predispositions—cognitive, affec-

tive, and motor—of the listener (p. 190). It appears that hearing, though necessary for recognition, by itself gave no sufficient basis for recognition, and that recognition became possible when the hearing reactions were supplemented by an attitude, an orientation, a preferential response on the boy’s part toward certain specific auditory situations (pp. 190–91).

In all cases recognizing is rendered possible by the carrying over of orientation, or attitude, from the original presentation to the re-presentation (p. 193).

16. Cf. James, \textit{Psychology} (354). “Whatever object possesses them [ardour and intimacy] in penetrating consciousness, its representation will partake of an ardour and intimacy analogous to those attaching to the present me.” In his recent work “Erkenntnistheorie,” Duerr (150, p. 44) explained recognition similarly: every event of consciousness associates itself with the act of experiencing; when the event again presents itself, that act of experiencing is reproduced. Then the subject is conscious of “having been through it” in the past.

17. Neither the lack of surprise, nor James’s and Duerr’s similar pronouncements, explain the phenomenon. Clapa-
Thus the theory of “me-ness” differs from those of associative stimulation and habit in assuming that it is not the aura of associations (of any sort) which makes for recognition, but the feeling of “me-ness.” 18

rède’s observation that “me-ness” is already present in perception is more to the point. Bartlett has experimentally shown that the attitudes responsible for recognition (and its distortions) are responsible for the organization of perception also. He realized that “me-ness” is not an undifferentiated feeling experience, but a matter of specific selective attitudes. The concept of selectiveness is crucial: if attitudes select in perception objects which have valences for them, then the same objects having valences will, on representation, arouse the very attitudes which originally selected them. This also is the core of Freud’s cathetic theory of perception and memory. (Cf. Chap. 15, notes 21 and 22, below. See also Rapaport, 596.) Recently Tolman (733) found it necessary to introduce similar concepts into his theory of learning.

18. A concrete analysis of the role of “me-ness,” which clarifies its relationship to the “aura of associations” and to “habits,” was put forth by Koffka (406). Koffka’s memory theory, which leans heavily on Koehler’s (401) findings, is built on the assumption of the existence of “memory traces” and the dynamics of “trace fields.” Koffka’s theory also assumes that the trace field contains a relatively well-segregated part—the ego-system. (This ego-concept differs radically from that of psychoanalysis.) Koffka wrote (406):

Our theory of the Ego . . . allows us to accept Claparède’s theory, freeing it from those aspects which are the outcome of the period at which he worked, and to incorporate it without any new hypothesis into our own system (p. 594).

In our theory the trace retained the dynamics of the process in a latent form. We also know that our environmental field does not consist of a number of “dead” or “indifferent” things, but that these things possess dynamic characters, such as physiognomic, functional, and demand characters [valences]. All these characters imply an object-Ego relationship, that is, an interplay of forces between the Ego and the environmental objects. Therefore, the trace of an object is, as a rule, part of a larger trace of which the object is but one subsystem, while a part of the Ego is another, these two sub-systems being connected by forces corresponding to the forces obtaining in the process of perception. Communication of the trace with a new object-process means, therefore, at least potentially, communication of this whole trace with the new process. And according to Claparède’s theory, recognition can take place only when the whole trace becomes involved and not merely the object subsystem (pp. 594–95).

This theory allows certain deductions about the conditions under which recognition is more or less likely to occur. Since it depends upon the participation of the Ego-part in the particular trace systems, the structure of this system will be of great importance. The closer the dynamic intercourse between the Ego and the object part, the more likely, ceteris paribus, will recognition be. Now in the structure of the behavioral environment there are things close to and remote from the Ego and even some that have practically no Ego-connection. According to the theory, and to all appearances in conformity with the facts, the former are better recognized than the
But does not this theory merely postpone the problem to be solved? It tells us that the objects touching upon our consciousness are characteristically tainted by it, somewhat as a painted bench would leave a mark on those who sat on it—so that consciousness [on meeting these objects again], recognizes latter. In many cases the Ego-object relationship will be, at least partly, due to the interests and attitudes of the Ego. Thus whatever has interested us, attracted our attention, is relatively easily recognized (pp. 595-96).

Koffka describes the role of the ego and attitudes in the trace field and their effect in recognition as follows:

We must remember the trace column with its preservation of the Ego-environment organization, and we must also remember the continuity of the Ego, which gives a special kind of structure to the Ego part of the column. Inasmuch as the Ego is, as a rule, more or less in the center of its environment, we can picture the Ego part of the trace column as its core and the environmental part as a shaft, keeping in mind that core and shaft support each other. We know that the shaft is full of strains and stresses which produce aggregation and other unifications of traces at various levels. But we also know that the core, despite its great internal complexity, has, as a whole, a much stronger unity than the shaft as a whole. If then an attitude arises, what will happen? To follow up our example: if I want to link up figures shown to me now with figures presented yesterday, what is my attitude, and how does it become effective? In the first place this attitude has the character of a quasi-need, it corresponds to a tension in the Ego part at the tip of the column. This tension can be relieved only through that part of the trace column which contains yesterday’s figures, since a linking up of today’s with yesterday’s is possible only if these traces influence the new process. In other words, the attitude requires the creation of a field which includes these particular traces (p. 609).

Koffka, however, doubts whether “me-ness” and “attitudes” are always indispensably necessary conditions for the communication with each other of traces, or traces and processes (hypothetical concomitants of past and present stimulations):

It is possible to interpret both Lewin and Bartlett as asserting that communication between process and trace as an event entirely within the shaft of the trace column does not occur. Whether such a claim is true or not, experiments will have to decide. Personally I do not believe it. Again I hold that dynamic relations within the shaft, that is, within the environmental field, and between core and shaft, may be effective, and not only dynamic relations within the core, the Ego system. Despite this belief, which, as I just said, will have to be tested by experiments, I recognize the enormous importance of attitudinal factors. As I envisage the problem, the alternative, either spontaneous recognition or recognition always mediated by attitude, does not exist.

That intra-shaft forces are necessary even where an attitude made communication possible, we have seen above. Thus a frank acceptance of the effectiveness of all the forces that may come into play seems the safest position to adopt before new experimental evidence is adduced (p. 611).

The relationship of Koffka’s theory to the psychoanalytic theory of memory and thinking, and to the recent experiments on the effect of motivational, set-like, and personality factors, is still unclear; so is the relationship of these factors to Lewin’s and Bartlett’s findings and theories. Yet it is quite clear that, as soon as we transcend the limitations
them because they bear its stamp, so to speak. But how does it "recognize" this stamp, this characteristic mark, as its own? How does the me recognize itself? Does one not reintroduce here the entire problem of recognition?

No; I believe that this new manner of posing the question is a step forward, for it eliminates one unknown: the past. It is no longer a matter of finding out by what mystery an impression can be known as the repetition of one in the past, but merely of finding in an image reappearing in consciousness those characteristics which make for its "me-ness." 19

Do these characteristics reside in an ease of the motor or intellectual reaction which elicits that perception of "familiarity"? No; because, as we have seen, habit is different from recognition, the habitual is different from the familiar. 20 Besides, if recognition were explained by habit, it should also be explained how

of purely associationist theory, the various findings and theories begin to converge. For instance, the problem of trace communications "within the environmental field" (that is, the direct communication of "shafts") shows some similarity to the psychoanalytic problem of relative "functional autonomy" of ego-processes, particularly thought-processes. See Chap. 19, below.

19. Bartlett's application of Head's (314) schema concept may shed further light on Claparède's comment that the concept "me-ness" eliminates one unknown—the past—from the theory of recognition. According to Head, "every postural change enters consciousness already charged with its relation to something that has gone before" (37, p. 199). In other words, it enters consciousness already integrated into the postural-model created by past changes. Every new change in turn alters the model in relation to which the next change will be experienced. These "organized models of ourselves" Head called "schemata" (37, p. 200). Bartlett generalized Head's "postural schema," applying it to memory-organization. The schemata are continuously changing with new experience. They are organized by attitudes, and it is by means of these attitudes (once they are re-aroused) that the organism "turns round upon its own 'schemata,'" recognizes and remembers. Bartlett concludes: "Remembering is a constructive justification of this attitude" (37, p. 200).

We thus see how the "past" is implicit to the memory schemata, and how it is eliminated by them as an unknown in recognition. Whether or not a memory can become conscious, or an experience recognized, depends upon the attitude which prevailed in the original perception; whether or not its "pastness" also will become conscious depends upon the attitude which determines the recall or the recognition. With the too-well-known, the prevailing attitudes can be justified in recall and recognition without a localization in the past. In déjà vu, the attitude and the experience of "pastness" together do not suffice to "justify" the attitude.

20. Cf. MacCurdy (488, p. 113) and Koffka (406, pp. 591 ff., particularly p. 596).
it follows from it. It would have to be explained how a process, merely by being repeated, can give us the impression that it belongs to us, that it is mine—that is to say, how can that consciousness of belonging to me, which is the basis of the feeling of familiarity, spring from an impression of an ease of reaction which is qualitatively quite different from it!

We touch here upon a very obscure and surely insoluble question. The continuity and personal character of consciousness are primitive facts for the psychologist, and must be taken for granted. The fact that consciousness regards the objects it perceives as its very own, as belonging to its experiences, and that they evoke, when they present themselves again, the same impression of "me-ness" which they bore before, is no doubt the manifestation of a primitive function which must be so taken for granted, because otherwise mental life would be inconceivable and psychology have no field.

The propensity of states of consciousness to cluster around a me which persists and remains the same in the course of time, is a postulate of psychology, as space is a postulate of geometry.21

But does this remark not render an explanation of "familiarity" illusory?

No. The unity, continuity, and personal character of consciousness are a conditio sine qua non of recognition; it is quite certain that for the psychologist they are given as a primitive datum. But does recognition spring directly from that continuity and that fundamental unity of consciousness? or is it the other way around, that there is an articulation between that fundamental unity and the feeling of familiarity, a link that can be found by empirical science? This is the problem.

If one considers cases of abnormality of or failure of recognition, the answer is clearly positive: the mechanism of the experience of familiarity is accessible

21. Claparède’s presentation of “me-ness” and consciousness as postulates must be understood to be a product of his struggle against the prevailing psychology of his time, which was one without “me-ness” and consciousness. The position of Rogers’s (617) concept of the “self” in our time is similar. Note W. Hunter’s (345) critique of the treatment of “consciousness” in the new Boring-Langfeld-Weld textbook (84), which is illuminating in this respect. Psychoanalysis, however, has succeeded in building a theory which—whatever its other shortcomings—demonstrates that a psychology which does not disregard self and consciousness need not introduce them as postulates, but rather as phenomenal data amenable to theoretical and experimental analysis. See Chap. 16, note 14, below.
to empirical science, and the proof is that it can be destroyed in isolation, while
the other parts of the mental apparatus continue to function more or less nor-

tmally.22

The states in which such isolated destruction or change can be seen are those
to which Katzaroff23 has already referred: Korsakow syndrome24 and the
post-hypnotic state.25 I should like to dwell at some length on the memory func-
tion of a Korsakow case which I examined on various occasions:

The patient was a woman hospitalized at Asile de Bel-Air. She was 47 at the
time of the first experiment, 1906. Her illness had started around 1900. Her old
memories remained intact: she could correctly name the capitals of Europe,
make mental calculations, and so on. But she did not know where she was,
though she had been at the asylum five years. She did not recognize the doctors
whom she saw every day, nor her nurse who had been with her for six months.26
When the latter asked the patient whether she knew her, the patient said: "No,
Madame, with whom have I the honor of speaking?'' She forgot from one min-
ute to the next what she was told, or the events that took place. She did not
know what year, month, and day it was, though she was being told constantly.
She did not know her age, but could figure it out if told the date.

I was able to show, by means of learning experiments done by the saving

22. A pathological condition in which
a certain function (in this case recog-
nition) is particularly impaired offers
exceptional opportunity to study the
function in question. But Claparède's
"destroyed in isolation'' implies more.
The more carefully we study the condi-
tions under which a certain function is
"destroyed in isolation,'' the clearer it
becomes that no such "isolation'' actually
exists. (See Chap. 27, below.) Our pre-
sent theoretical view of the psychic ap-
paratus makes it difficult in any case to
conceive of such isolated destruction.
Cf. our considerations on varying states
of consciousness, Chap. 9, notes 25 and
55, and Chap. 13, notes 21, 22, 50, and
56, below.

23. Katzaroff (378).

24. See Chaps. 13 and 27; cf. also
Rapaport (591, pp. 223 ff.), for evidence
that the disorder in the Korsakow syn-
drome is by no means an isolated mem-
ory disorder.

25. Erickson and Erickson (163) have
adduced evidence that post-hypnotic
memory phenomena are not isolated
memory changes. Post-hypnotic behav-
ior, according to them, is always em-
bedded in a spontaneously renewed
trance state, as indicated by observable
features besides the execution of the
post-hypnotic suggestion.

26. This is the memory disorder usu-
ally described as anterograde amnesia.
See Rapaport (591, pp. 218 ff.). For the
description of the most extreme case of
this sort reported, see Stoerring (715).
Cf. also Krauss (418), and Chaps. 13 and
27, below.
method, that not all ability of mnemonic registration was lost in this person.27* 
What is worthy of our attention here was her inability to evoke recent memo-
ries voluntarily, while they did arise automatically, by chance, as recogni-
tions.28

When one told her a little story, read to her various items of a newspaper, 
three minutes later she remembered nothing, not even the fact that someone 
had read to her; but with certain questions one could elicit in a reflex fashion 
some of the details of those items.29* But when she found these details in her 
consciousness, she did not recognize them as memories but believed them to be 
something "that went through her mind" by chance, an idea she had "without 
knowing why," a product of her imagination of the moment, or even the result 
of reflection.30

I carried out the following curious experiment on her: to see whether she 
would better retain an intense impression involving affectivity, I stuck her hand 
with a pin hidden between my fingers. The light pain was as quickly forgotten 
as indifferent perceptions; a few minutes later she no longer remembered it. 
But when I again reached out for her hand, she pulled it back in a reflex fashion, 
not knowing why. When I asked for the reason, she said in a flurry, "Doesn't 
one have the right to withdraw her hand?" and when I insisted, she said, "Is 
there perhaps a pin hidden in your hand?" To the question, "What makes you 
suspect me of wanting to stick you?" she would repeat her old statement, "That

27.* Cf. my note (131) and the thesis 
of Mrs. Bergmann (50), also similar 
experiments by Brodmann (95) and Gregor (187).
[ Prior to these experiments it was as-
sumed that such anterograde amnesias 
were due to loss of registration ability. 
See Stoerring (715); compare also Kohn-
stamm (410).]

28. It is characteristic of what Freud 
calls the secondary process that in it 
ideas can be evoked voluntarily, while in 
the primary process they always rise 
automatically. It should be noted, how-
ever, that at times even in ordered think-
ing voluntary effort does not avail. The 
dividing lines are not sharp here. Cf. 
Rapaport et al. (602, I, 167–69, 176–79, 

29.* See Katzaroff's (378, p. 25) ex-
amples.

30. The inability for voluntary recall 
and the lack of "me-ness" may both be 
related to the absence of the necessary 
27, notes 27, 28, 38, 43, 46, below. They 
report cases in which, instead of lack of 
"me-ness" of a memory, "me-ness" at-
tended even suggested ideas and raised 
them to the status of memories. Both 
observations indicate an impairment of 
the reflective awareness characteristic of normal states of consciousness.
was an idea that went through my mind,” or she would explain, “Sometimes pins are hidden in people’s hands.” But never would she recognize the idea of sticking as a “memory.”

What does a case like this teach us about recognition?

It is clear from these experiments (which I repeated a number of times and in various ways) that if the patient did not recognize the memories or the objects, it was not because the objects evoked no associations or adaptive reactions in her. On the contrary: in the very halls of the institution which she claimed not to recognize (though she had now been there six years), she walked around without getting lost; she knew how to find the toilet without being able to say where it was, describe it, or have a conscious memory of it. When the nurse came she did not know who she was (“With whom have I the honor of talking?”), but soon after would ask her whether dinner time was near, or some other domestic question. These facts prove that her habits were very well re-

31. This observation may at first appear strikingly unique. It is so in the sense that the experience implied in the cognized thought is not recognized even though it is recent. Closer scrutiny shows that the striking uniqueness lies only in the recency and concreteness of the experience not recognized. A great variety of other cognitions without recognitions is familiar to us in psychopathology and psychotherapy. Obsessions, for instance, are “ego-alien” ideas, that is, we do not recognize them as our own. They are devoid of the direct experience of “me-ness” (even though the attendant anxiety may indirectly indicate “me-ness”). True, in these cases it is not a concrete experience—that is, one in which an external event played a paramount role—which remains unrecognized. Let us consider, however, a delusion; for instance, a simple delusional variant of the obsession, “I may kill my sister”: namely, “I have killed my sister.” Here an internal experience is recognized, correctly in so far as “me-ness” is concerned, incorrectly as a concrete external experience. Further examples of cognition without recognition are seen in the course of psychoanalytic (and other) therapy, when memories of concrete events, internal experiences, and relationships emerge in the form of dreams, hypnagogic experiences, daydreams, associations, direct representations amidst vehement denials, direct representations with some “me-ness” but devoid of corresponding emotions, etc. Cf. Freud (248, and 209, pp. 546–47), and Chap. 23, III, below.

The only attempt to systematize form variants of conscious experience, both those here discussed and others, was undertaken by the phenomenological school of philosophy and psychology: Husserl (346), Meinong (511), and Brentano (90). See also Binswanger (63), and for a recent popularizing account, Sartre (631); on Sartre, cf. also Rapaport (598), also Chap. 25, note 6, and Chap. 26, note 128, below.
tained and active, and if she did not recognize her room, her nurse, or the man who had just stuck her with a pin, it was not because these objects were not tied up with associations or adaptive reactions.

If one examines the behavior of such a patient, one finds that everything happens as though the various events of life, however well associated with each other in the mind, were incapable of integration with the me itself. The patient is alive and conscious. But the images which he perceives in the course of that life, which penetrate and become more or less fixated in his organic memory, lodge there like strange bodies; and if by chance they cross the threshold of consciousness, they do not evoke the feeling of “me-ness” which alone can turn them into “memories.”

We can distinguish between two sorts of mental connections: those established mutually between representations, and those established between representations and the me, the personality. In the case of purely passive associations or idea-reflexes, solely the first kind of connection operates; in the case of voluntary recall and recognition, where the me plays a role, the second kind of connection enters.

In relation to the me as center, the connections of the second kind may be called egocentric functions, those of the first marginal. In recognition, the action of these egocentric connections is centripetal—that is, the perception or representation given evokes a feeling of “me-ess.” In voluntary recall, the action of the egocentric connections is centrifugal. “Voluntary” here means only that the me is involved in determining the phenomenon; the manner of its intervention is not stated.

This hypothesis concerning the intervention of the me—which by the way

32. The phrases “lodge there like strange bodies” and “by chance cross the threshold of consciousness” fail to do justice to the phenomenon. It appears rather that these memories come to consciousness quite appropriately and not “by chance,” though they cannot be voluntarily evoked. Therefore we must assume that they are integrated with memory- and thought-organization, though in such fashion that “me-ness” does not accompany their conscious experience. The nature of habits and automatisms implies a similar problem for the theory of memory- and thought-organization. Cf. Hartmann on ego-apparatuses, Chap. 19, VIII, below.

33. This is the problem which Koffka has formulated in terms of interactions between trace-core and trace-shaft, vs. those between two trace-shafts. See note 18, above.
The relationship of the loss of recognition to the loss of voluntary recall—though by no means proven to be general—is an important and unclear issue. The prerequisite for its clarification is a dynamic theory of the will, which we do not have as yet. It may be assumed that the subjective experience of will, and the motivational conditions to which it corresponds, both depend upon the distribution of cathectic energies at the disposal of the ego, and on their relationship to the cathectic energies of the id. The specific cathectic conditions corresponding to the form-variants of will experience have not been explored as yet. Nor has the relationship been clarified between the motivating attitudes of recognition and recall on the one hand, and the distribution of cathectic energies underlying volition, on the other.

Similarly, we may assume that hypnosis, or rather the post-hypnotic state, is a suspending of the activity of egocentric associations, which at once blocks recognition as well as voluntary recall; meanwhile marginal associations continue in the form of automatisms, automatic writing, or automatic recall. These the subject does not recognize as memories, but takes to be “inspirations” or casts into an hallucinatory form.

The difference between the post-hypnotic state and the Korsakow syndrome is that in the latter there is a pathological disorder of the egocentric connections; in hypnosis and post-hypnotic states there is only an inhibitory suspension of them. This hypothesis is in accord with the lack of initiative characteristic of hypnotic subjects. In the wake of that inhibition, the images presented in hypnosis do not unite with the normal me, and when they emerge later, they appear to the me as something foreign, never before experienced.

Thus we understand the nature of the relation between feelings of familiarity...
and voluntary recall; both imply the existence of "me-ness." Voluntary acts imply processes which we call "me." If for one reason or another some presentations are not associated with a feeling of "me-ness," the subject does not have the impression of possessing them and thus cannot recall them—as one cannot at will move his ears unless the muscles have first revealed their existence through certain inner sensations. The first prerequisite of recalling a memory is the impression that we possess it. It is thus understandable that if the impression of "me-ness" is destroyed, the absence of recognition which follows is coupled with an absence of voluntary recall.

The feeling of "me-ness" is, so to speak, the tie that binds the memory-image to our me, by which we hold on to it and by virtue of which we can summon it from the depths of the subconscious. If that tie is severed, we lose the ability of voluntary recall. This relation between recognition and voluntary recall seems to me to be corroborated by the examination of the biological significance of the feeling of familiarity. What purpose is served by this feeling of familiarity as a distinct conscious phenomenon? The lower animals behave as though they recognized their food, their enemies, etc. But this is a matter of implicit mechanical and reflex recognition, explainable entirely by the existence of innate or acquired

38. In psychoanalytic terms, this would read "preconscious." French psychology and psychiatry used the term "subconscious" for both the preconscious and the unconscious.

39. The relation of recognition to preconscious thought-processes is treated extensively by Kris, Chap. 23, below. The voluntary vs. involuntary character of subjective experience appears to be dependent (as in attention vs. concentration) on the availability and distribution of energy-cathexes at the disposal of the ego (cf. Chap. 15, note 21, below).

The experience of "me-ness" appears to be dependent on the prevailing state of consciousness, which in turn is also dependent on the distribution of attention cathexes (see Chap. 16, note 14, this volume). In dreams, for instance, though the totality of the dream is built of the dreamer's wishes and experiences, only part of them has a "me-ness." The situation is similar for the loss of "me-ness" in cases of fugue and multiple personality. In recording various thought-formations of my own, ranging from those in hypnagogic to those in dream states, I obtained material suggesting that the closer the state approximates that of the dream the more "me-ness" recedes, self-reflective awareness is in abeyance, voluntary effort (or its effectiveness) becomes sparse, involuntarily rising ideas lacking "me-ness" become more frequent, and thought-formations resembling those of multiple personality begin to occur.
connections between certain impressions and certain adequate reactions. A feeling of familiarity is of no use here. Why did the process of implicit recognition become explicit, that is, mental? For the very reason other physiological processes became so: our processes become conscious (or, if you please, cortical) when they must master new reactions or are sufficiently tied to impressions met before; and they fall back into the subconscious when the habit is sufficiently established. The feeling of familiarity thus appears where its presence, as a mental phenomenon, becomes necessary for an adequate reaction—that is, where the recognized object does not immediately evoke such a reaction. When we meet a friend in the street we greet him without a conscious feeling of familiarity; in this case, implicit reflex recognition suffices. But when someone looks familiar and we cannot at once tell when and where we met him, whether or not we have been introduced and consequently should greet him—there the feeling of familiarity is useful to prod our attention into searching our memory (voluntary recall), in order to form an adequate reaction.

These pages do not claim to have greatly illumined the problem of the feeling of familiarity! They are meant to show that the problem is easily accessible to psychological investigation, which is denied by that discouraging and sterile opinion which considers it an irreducible and unanalyzable faculty of consciousness. The feeling of familiarity implies the intervention of the me, that is, those factors that constitute the personality; therefore the analysis of its conditions of existence is obscured by the fact that we are still unclear as to the nature and function of these factors. It may well be the most fruitful result of the study of recognition is that it gives us a new angle from which to regard the problems of the me and the mechanisms of "me-ness." 

APPENDIX

Recognition in spite of distortion of mental images. Those who have conducted experiments requiring a subject to describe the memory of a picture

40. Cf. Lewin, on the valences of genuine-needs, Chap. 5, II, 1 (c), below.
42. Cf. MacCurdy (488).
43. Herein lies the main merit of Claparède’s paper. The role of personality factors in such basic processes as learning, memory, recognition, and perception, has been too long disregarded. Claparède elucidated an important facet of this role. Even though recently many experimenters have tackled this issue, few have seen the general problem in such broad terms as Claparède. Cf., however, Alper (28).
observed for a certain time, must have noticed his astonishment when he is again confronted with the original. Though recognizing it at once, he will say, “I didn’t imagine it that way.” He thought that “this person was turned the other way,” “that object was bigger” or “another color”; but all this does not prevent him from being certain that it is the picture he had seen. Recognition does not imply the presence of a memory-image which compares with the original or fuses with the perception. If this were the case, a deformation of the memory-image would block recognition.

I shall present some minor experiments conducted with students—quoting but a few, since they are easily repeated—which clearly show that the recognition process is independent of a memory-image:

A series of eight pictures (colored vignettes) is presented for thirty seconds; immediately afterwards the subject describes them in writing. Then the pictures are again shown, but this time interspersed among other similar ones. The subject is to state which ones he recognizes and what impressions they make on him. The experiments always yielded correct results, that is, the pictures actually seen before were always recognized.

On examining the descriptions and remarks of the subjects, we find that they show little correspondence to the real pictures. For example:

1. A Basket Full of Fruit. Written description: “A large basket full of flowers.” Verbal remark upon seeing the picture again: “I thought it was flowers but I see it is fruit; I thought the basket was square and lighter in color. Now I remember having seen the apples and pears.”


3. A Woman Holding a Watering Pot. Verbal remark: “She seems bigger than I thought. I imagine she was watering flowers.” (The absence of flowers did not prevent definite recognition.)

4. Two Urchins Sitting on a Sled. Verbal remark: “I didn’t represent them in that pose; I thought they were sitting astride the sled.” The subject then added: “It is not by the memory-image that I recognize it; that came afterwards, I am quite sure.”

These few examples—I do not find it necessary to give more—support some of Mr. Katzaroff’s conclusions; that is why I mention them here.

44. Cf. Bartlett (37, p. 194).